Surrounding Areas represent the cohabitation of change and continuity-a transformation in the way international environment is seen through a reified perception of 'Asia' as Japan's existential milieu. In the first section, I discuss how we can conceptualise recalibration of threat perception in which the reified signifier of pacifism provides the platform upon which emergent threats are perceived. The second section discusses the transformation of 'danger' as a historical process, whereby Asia as a geographical designation and the defence of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) has always been central to Japanese policy makers. Section three explores the ambiguities inherent within the official Surrounding Areas narratives as signifying the emergence of a convenient rhetorical tool representing the shift in threat perception; and the fourth section analyses how policy makers use ambiguities to mean 'what happens determines the location'. Such official narratives provide a rather sanitised view of Japan's threat perception; but the various official rhetorical contortions provide a useful insight into Tokyo's official worldviews and the associated Asia Imaginary. Put differently, there are apt to be subtle meanings inherent within such official lip-services: it means they warrant further inspection.
The final section very briefly explores the prospects for further recalibration under the DPJ government.
Recalibration of Threat Perception
The emergence of Surrounding Areas narratives as a situational, rather than a geographical, term signifies a shift in Japan's threat perception in response to international events. It involves an interplay of identity as a historical product, on the one hand; with the subjective nature of threat perception, on the other. Foreign policy pronouncements are tantamount to speech acts representing an actor's worldviews addressing the perceived challenges in the international environment whereby inputs from exogenous factors reinforce an actor's sense of Self in opposition to potentially dangerous Others. David Campbell (1998: 197) observes that state identity is a 'stylized repetition of practices' constituting a feedback loop involving identity reconstruction along with external factors reinforcing collective worldviews and the language representing them.
This cycle amounts to a macro-level reconstruction of institutional facts. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966: 69-70) point out that 'social order is a human product, or, more precisely, an ongoing human production. It is produced by man in the course of his ongoing externalization'. The end product of this process-an actor's worldview-is fluid and flexible, and as John Searle (1995: 7) argues, '[s]ymbols do not create cats and dogs and evening stars; they create only the possibility of referring to cats, dogs, and evening stars in a publicly accessible way'. In the case of a state actor, the designation of neighbours as 'friends' or 'foes' is a social construction however much they seem 'real' to policy elites. Searle (1995: 96) adds that 'the remarkable feature of institutional structures is that people continue to acknowledge and cooperate in many of them even when it is by no means obviously to their advantage to do so'. This means that anxieties manifest where actors engage in habituated relationships. This is the case since worldviews and ideas about the international environment leave the authorship of the authors to assume the lives of their own (Archer, 1995) . As Margaret Archer (1995: 324) argues, ' [w]hat we confront in daily life are, in fact, particular confirmations and what we meet and treat as amalgams are, in fact, specific forms of amalgamation'. Whenever new externalities emerge, they are met with anxiety-only for policies to be adjusted and new reality engaged. Japan experienced such change-versus-continuity nexus before.
August 1945 meant 'embracing defeat' in order to rebuild a battered nation; but the continuity of Japanese Self across August 1945 became manifest through the forgetting of Japan's atrocities in Asia, sowing the seeds of contemporary conflict and reinforcing the Japanese view-however ethnocentric-that Asia remains a hostile neighbourhood (Dower, 1998; Hicks, 1997; Buruma, 1994) .
The recalibration of threat perception takes place when the sense of Self is congealed and the perception of danger shifts as the international environment transforms, precipitating an evolution in the Self-Other dichotomy. Agents refine speech acts through the frame of reference provided by historically reinforced identity, while seeking to address the shifting images of the dangerous Otherness, however vague those threats may be (Roe, 2008) . Jutta Weldes (1999: 10) posits that national interests are social constructions created as meaningful objects out of which the intersubjective and culturally established meanings within which the world, particularly the international system and the place of the state in it, is understood.
Collective memories and identities enable policy elites to share threat perceptions and the common language for addressing them. As Searle (1995: 24-25) argues, it is the act of 'doing things together' that fosters a sense of collective actorhood irreducible to a mere aggregation of individual attributes; and through this process, a dominant narrative of foreign policy emerges.
Given the fluid nature of institutional facts, there are apt to be contradictions.
Actors might be socialised into expecting a certain outcome deriving from a familiar social interaction; but due to there being a constellation of external actors, unexpected outcomes emerge. As Searle (1995: 92) notes, 'when institutions are maintained largely by habit, they can also collapse quite suddenly'. To be sure, not all changes occur suddenly. Anthony Giddens (1984: 198) points to the 'fault lines' in the structural constitution of societal systems lending themselves to a slower transformation in intersubjective structures. In Japanese foreign policy, various factors including: geographical constraints; the prevailing domestic identity narratives; and international political factors such as the rise of China and tensions in the Taiwan Strait and Korean Peninsula, delimit foreign policy choices available for Tokyo.
Consequently, identity might shift from being a peace state jealously guarding Article 9 of the Constitution to a pacifist state with ambitions to become a 'normal state' (futsu no kuni) ready to engage militarily under the auspices of the United Nations (Ozawa, 1995) . The reiteration of pacifism might be a lip-service; but this also suggests that the signifier has become a rhetorical tool within which Japanese foreign policy is couched.
People, as well as governments, come and go. But the institutionalised notion of Self and a generalised danger are inherited from one generation of policy makers to another. Colin Wight (2006: 296) argues that, Agential power in a social context is dependent upon structural positioning, but is not reducible to it. And social structures have a mode of being and a set of causal powers that are not reducible to the individuals upon whose activity they depend.
There are apt to be slippages between: (1) how one generation of policy makers within a particular international environment of the particular times reconstruct particular worldviews, on the one hand; and (2) the culture of diplomatic practices framing the narratives of Japan's Asian existence, on the other. It is conceivable that the established Self/Other dichotomy within policy circles might shift with the relentlessly evolving international environment. Hence, reified worldviews confront international contexts encouraging policy makers to seek solutions from within the existing tool box available to them, namely the institutional practice. This process needs to be understood as an inevitable part of institutional life which entails recalibrations in the language of threat construction (Schiff, 2008: 363-77; Adler, 2008) . As Rafael Narvaez (2006: 66) suggests, collective memories act as a catalyst for not only looking back, but looking forward as well. Hidemi Suganami (2002: 29) adds that, Grounded in historically continuous collective consciousness, a state (an effective one) presents itself as a historical, societal, given-or reality-to all individuals inside and outside the state, even though it would be true to say that the state would not exist, or continue to do so, if no individual even held seriously the belief that it existed.
Hence, the collective idea of Self has the potential to act as a template upon which future foreign policy decisions are framed.
New signifiers emerge from the process of threat recalibration; and this shift needs to be experienced by someone. We need to take account of a historically constructed collective identity that allows policy makers to not only experience and address external challenges, but also to bequeath such institutional experience from one generation to another. If we discount collective memory as an integral factor in the construction and recalibration of threat perception, then we fail to account for the vast library of knowledge that institutions possess. This is a reification of collective identity within the policy circles, but we need to take this process seriously because reification is also a social process. As Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper (2000: 5) argue, Reification is a social process, not only an intellectual practice. As such, it is central to the politics of 'ethnicity', 'race', 'nation', and other putative identities. Analysts of this kind of politics should seek to account for this process of reification.
Again, it is tempting to treat Japan's pacifism as a lip-service. Yet, it is also telling that Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo reiterated Japan's peace state narrative and regional imaginary in a May 2008 speech to the International Conference on the Future of Asia. In it, Fukuda argued that a new era (shin jidai) has arrived in which Japan, China, and South Korea share responsibility for the future of Asia and the wider world. He stated that, 'Japan promises to work hard towards becoming an "International Peace Co-operating Country (heiwa kyoroku kokka)" to secure international peace in the Asia-Pacific region and the wider world', adding that a new web of relationships in the region effectively shrinks the Pacific Ocean into a tighter mesh of pan-regional network similar in scope to the Mediterranean.
3 Even if it is a diplomatic nicety, this signifier reappears frequently in policy pronouncements to the effect that if we are to account for the ambiguities of Surrounding Areas, the deployment of such rhetorical devices needs to be take seriously.
Japan's Search for a Narrative
The post-Cold War international environment, particularly after 9/11, compels Tokyo to search for a narrative that conforms to its participation in the so-called 'War on Christiansen (1999: 58-59) argues that the previous 1978 Guidelines were 'viewed in the United States as lopsided and unfair because the United States guarantees Japanese security without clear guarantees of even rudimentary assistance from Japan if U.S. forces were to become embroiled in a regional armed conflict'. Superficially, the New Guidelines respond to such criticisms; but Japan's incremental responsibility under the 1997 version can also be seen as an adjustment within the larger framework of the MSA in order for Tokyo to realign its sense of Self in response to newly emerging dangers. Reiterating the ambiguity of Surrounding Areas, Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara (2001/02: 171) point out that in 'situations where rear-area support may be required, these areas are not necessarily limited to East Asia', adding that 'the scope of the areas surrounding Japan is variable and depends on a functional and conceptual, rather than a geographic and objective, construction of Japan's changing security environment' (172).
Yet, pacifism as a post-war signifier of Japan that is distinct from its pre-war Self, involves a narrative feedback loop whereby it provides a backdrop against which international events are interpreted and Asian imaginary reformulated. Within the mainstream political establishment, pacifism does not preclude military capabilities; but rather, it entails a sensitive balancing act in seeking enhanced international political role for Japan while placating the neighbours. Even the MOD webpage states that its mission is to improve international security environment and pursue confidence-building through communication; and to encourage transparency between and among the various defence authorities.
5 Thus, the policy narratives tend toward militarily contributing to international peace and security. Iriye Akira (1991: 211) argues that, Japan has so far decided not to go down the path of remilitarisation. This is because the domestic society and politics colluded in the emergence of public opinion in favour of economic restructuring rather than military revival…. But whether or not Japan will become a military superpower again depends on the existence of an international environment tolerant of such an adventure, meaning it is not just for the Japanese people to decide.
To be sure, Japan's pacifism is 'not a monolithic concept' (Izumikawa, 2010: 125 (Izumikawa, 2010: 156-57) . This partly explains Tokyo's awkwardness in rationalising the US nuclear umbrella. Strong public opposition to nuclear weapons lend credence to Japan's campaigning on nuclear non-proliferation as a hallmark of its pacifist inclination. However, this enthusiasm is tempered through alliance commitments, treating US nuclear arsenals as a necessary evil (Sato, 2010: 47-48) .
Hence, Japan's collective sense of danger cohabitates with a fear of entrapment and the deployment of pacifist rhetoric as a default language; but the reality of its Asian existence translates into a fear of abandonment in response to the North Korean nuclear programme and the rise of China (Izumikawa, 2010: 158 shifted towards 'revitalising' Japan while admitting to Japan's war time atrocities (Watanabe, 2007: 138) . Part of the solution was to adopt kokuren chushin shugi (UNcentrism) in the 1990s as a way to address both the changes in demands from the international community, while satiating Japan's appetite in addressing such concerns (Bergström, 1999: 174) . As such, while Tokyo seeks to satisfy its international ambition, anxieties about the role of China remain; and that it will always be concerned about managing its alliance relationship with the US (Kingston, 2011: 140) .
Hence, Asia as a potentially hostile entity remains an anchorage upon which Japan determines its international posture.
Change and Continuity in Japan's Asia Imaginary
Japan's reified image of Asia as a hostile neighbourhood is a historical construct.
Euan Graham (2006: ch. 3) observes that the brute fact of Japan's geography instils a sense of vulnerability, whether be it an invasion of the homeland via the Korean Peninsula or through the blockade of SLOC to the south. This explains both the contemporary threat perception and the concerns of Meiji oligarchs during the late 19 th century: for Japanese policy makers throughout the centuries, Asia has been an opportunity as well as a source of anxiety (Duus, 1995: 20-21) . Maruyama Masao (1961: 9-10) argues that kaikoku (the opening) after 1853 marked Japan's exposure to the Realpolitik of imperial powers; and Masao Miyoshi (1996: 186) suggests that this precipitated the emergence of a worldview through which Japan felt it had no choice but to embark upon its own programme of semi-colonialism.
The 1890s saw Field Marshal Yamagata Aritomo identify the 'cordons of sovereignty and interest '. Iriye (1966: 30-31) notes that the 'cordon of sovereignty' referred to the Japanese territory itself, while the 'cordon of interest' remained an 'ambiguous, and a tautological, concept' prescribing a defence periphery necessary for the security of the homeland. Peter Duus (1995: 17) argues that 'the "cordon of interest" included the weaker neighboring countries that might become the object of Western imperialist aggression' unless Japan took steps to pre-empt it. Consequently, Japan's aggression towards Asia was justified domestically as necessary for national security (Najita and Harootunian, 1998: 212) , constructing Asia as an object of desire, as well as a signifier reminding pre-war policy makers of Japan's purported uniqueness as the sole Asian power capable of standing up to the West. By the mid1930s, Tokyo felt that the conflict with the West over Asia became inevitable (Iriye, 1966: 107-13) ; and the idea of Greater Far Eastern Co-prosperity Sphere emerged in an effort at consolidating Asian coalition against the West. Once the periphery was understood to be weak and vulnerable, Tokyo decided that the only recourse to defending the homeland was for Japan to preside over the rest of Asia (Ito, 1998).
Tokyo realised that Asia and its vulnerability constituted a source of insecurity, legitimising its self-proclaimed, ethno-centric, role as a 'liberator', alter-casting Asia as an Otherness against which the Japanese Self needed protection.
Japan's defeat in the Second World War marked a significant psychological rupture. John Dower (1999: 24) argues that the post-war occupiers 'encountered a populace sick of war, contemptuous of the militarists who had led them to disaster, and all but overwhelmed by difficulties of the present circumstance in a ruined land'.
Yet, a further inspection also reveals that the emergent pacifism failed to reject military role for Japan. Indeed, the Cold War gave the impression that threat to national existence remained; and Japan's decision to outsource defence to the US, thereby allowing itself to focus on reconstruction, enabled post-war generations of policy makers to maintain Japan's pacifist demeanour before embarking upon gradual remilitarisation (Chai, 1997) . For Jeff Kingston (2011: 131) , the sense of 'living in a dangerous neighborhood with unpredictable neighbors has created opportunities in Japan for advocates of enhanced security capabilities to achieve their long-standing agendas'. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo proposed changes to the Constitution, arguing that it was a diktat (oshitsuke kempo); but Watanabe Osamu (2007: 138-39) cautions that, unlike Nakasone's nationalism, it lacked any sense of recompense towards the past. Indeed, Kingston (2011: 132) suggests that the 'public backlash [to his proposal] was unexpectedly strong'. Similar backlash was witnessed by the Sato cabinet in the 1960s when the then-prime minister admitted that the Korean Peninsula fell within Japan's defence periphery precipitating a media uproar (Watanabe, 2010: 19) . Hence, the obscuring of 'definitional lines between Article 5 and Article 6 missions [under the MSA] between "defensive defense" and "collective self-defense" under Japan's basic defense posture' (Kingston, 2011: 132) became the only viable narrative through which Tokyo was able to address changes in the international system. As such, pacifism acts as a convenient narrative signifying rupture from the pre-war Self while constituting an integral part of the language of post-war foreign policy (Katzenstein, 1996) .
The outsourcing of defence also signified the resilience of Japan's perception that Asia continues to be a dangerous neighbourhood. The continuity of this psychological milieu derives primarily from geopolitical constraints; but it is further sustained by an organic continuity in the form of military personnel whose experiences and threat perceptions from the War were deemed necessary in preparing Japan to confront post-war defence challenges. As Graham (2006: 98-99) argues, the [Maritime Self Defence Forces (MSDF)] was a direct descendant of the Imperial Navy, retaining many of its personnel, as well as its customs, traditions and institutional forms. As part of this, the MSDF also inherited the ambitions of those whose 'beautiful dream' was to restore Japan's post-war navy to a fully fledged stand-alone force whose mission would be to defend Japan's SLOC…. The presence of Imperial Navy veterans at all key levels of the fledgling MSDF also ensured that the institutional memory of the wartime blockade was passed on.
To be sure, Japan's post-war worldview and policy orientation entail significant US input. As Qingxin Ken Wang (2003: 112) argues, Japanese ambivalence in maintaining its pacifist narrative while simultaneously enjoying the protection under the US nuclear umbrella is a product of socialisation between Tokyo and Washington (ibid.). He suggests that, It was the deliberate American and Japanese policies and the external events caused intentionally or unintentionally by the United States, such as the occupation of Japan, the 1960 security treaty crisis, and Japan's rapid economic growth that have led to the emergence of the new Japanese security culture and the resultant dominance of pro-American centrists both inside and outside the LDP.
The Sino-American standoff in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-96 following the Taiwanese presidential election, along with the North Korean nuclear issue 'paved the way for intense intra-alliance communication for perceptive convergence, with a specific reminder to Japanese officials that regional peace and stability were no better guaranteed in the post-Cold War than in the Cold War itself' (Suzuki, 2010: 502 Asia remains a significant factor in Japan's threat perception, although the post-9/11 era suggests that the dangers are more diffuse.
Japanese identity has always been oscillating between Japan that is firmly located in Asia as a geographical location, yet sentimentally distinct from it as a notional entity (Yoon, 1997; Koshiro, 1999) . The image of Asia as a perceived source of threat has been reified as a reality against which Japan's national security calculations are based. According to the MOD, the MSA functions to guarantee Japanese sovereignty and facilitates in maintaining peace and stability in the Far East.
Furthermore, it argues that the close co-operation between Japan and the US contributes towards the peace and stability of the Surrounding Areas, and is indispensable even after the end of the Cold War. The change of language from 'international contribution' (kokusai koken) to 'international co-operation' (kokusai heiwa kyoryoku katsudo) marks a change in attitude. While 'kokusai koken' seems to signify Japan that is taking a 'step back' as a spectator, 'kokusai heiwa kyoryoku katsudo' implies Japan's willingness to partake in international activities. Given the process of globalisation, distant events can potentially threaten Japan's security. To that extent, it is imperative that Japan proactively responds to them as though if the country is directly affected by such events.
Determining whether this change is the result of meticulous calculation or whether it is borne of events superseding domestic policy discussions remains difficult. However, the ambiguities of the official narratives represent Japanese policy makers rationalising exogenous factors such as US pressures and the rise of China.
Surrounding Areas as a New Language
The New Guidelines reiterate Japan's historically constructed threat perception alluding to the familiar symbols of post-war Japanese national identity-a language that invokes revised MSA of 1960 and other defence-related pronouncements. MSA states that the intention of both the US and Japan is to 'uphold the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter in wishing to cohabitate peacefully with all the peoples and governments' along with the desire to 'maintain international peace and security of the Far East' (the Preamble). At the same time, Article 4 states that 'the State Parties agree to regularly consult one another in the implementation of this Treaty;
and when a threat to Japan's security, or threats to peace and security of the Far East, emerge, then either of the State Parties can demand consultation'.
The MOD seeks to reassure the public of its peaceful intentions. Its website suggests that peace and security cannot simply be wished: they must be realised through multiple channels including diplomacy and economic interdependence.
Reference is made to Japan's predicament as a resource-poor country dependent on imports, emphasising the need to foster international peace and harmony (kyocho). Duality in Japan's security interests reappears in the New Guidelines. On the one hand, the narratives of pacifism are apparent. Section II, Paragraph 2, reiterates constitutional constraints as the framework for policy construction; and in Section III, Paragraph 3, the US-Japan alliance is depicted as a crucial ingredient in guaranteeing a stable international security environment. On the other hand, it introduces the concept of Surrounding Areas. For instance, Section IV, Paragraph 1, states that the alliance will bear in mind that 'depending on the developments in the surrounding areas, both the Japanese and American governments will maintain close co-operation' in contemplating counter-measures. Once the present and clear danger is identified, the SDF 'will initiate defensive action primarily within Japanese territory and the surrounding waters and airspace', while the US forces provide support (Sec. IV, Para. the US Navy 'will conduct joint operations necessary for the defence of the surrounding seas and the protection of maritime transport', adding that the main task for the SDF will be 'to defend major ports and channels, along with the surrounding seas' (Sec. IV, Para. 2, 2 [ro]).
The New Guidelines reiterate an earlier working paper. The joint US-Japan committee discussing the revision met in Honolulu in June 1997 producing an interim report. It begins with a reference to Japan's constitutional constraints (Sec. III, Para.
2) as defining Japan's defence capability. It also refrains from delineating the defence perimeter, and instead, introduced the term Surrounding Areas in Section IV, Paragraph 1(4), noting that 'the Japanese and American governments shall foster the basis for defence co-operation conducive to effectively supporting military actions aimed at [defending] Japan and its surrounding areas'. Moreover, it argues that 'should circumstances in surrounding areas entail assessments identifying imminent military threat to Japan', the allies will co-operate in preparing counter-measures (Sec. 
Ambiguities as a Language of Recalibration
The official narratives of Surrounding Areas combine the evolving contemporary threat perception with the historical appreciation of Japan's geographical vulnerability.
Peter Katzenstein (1996: 148) argues that pacifism constrains Japan's strategic considerations by placing 'great obstacles in the path of those who want to make Japan a normal country, with a normal military force and normal levels of military spending; the government's room for maneuver has been much smaller for external than for internal security policy'. The cohabitation of an assertion by the JDA/MOD regarding Japan's peaceful intentions, on the one hand; and MOFA's emphasis on pacifism, on the other is telling. The JDA/MOD recognises the necessity of reiterating the peace state narrative, arguing that SDF is a minimum requirement in guaranteeing national security while lending credence to pacifist claims (JDA, 2006: 74-75 (Yahuda, 2011: 319) . This precipitated a perception gap between the US and Japan in which Washington considered Japan to be a 'free-rider', while Tokyo feared entrapment. Tanaka Akihiko (2010: 38) adds that, by 1994, Tokyo realised the inadequacy of the legal framework stipulating American bases on Japan and Tokyo's ability to provide assistance. This sense of 'drift' in alliance 'led to its revamping' (Yahuda, 2011: 319) ; and Japan's enhanced international military involvement was considered essential in highlighting Tokyo's continued commitment to the alliance, particularly following the heightened sense of emergency on the Korean Peninsula (Tanaka, 2010: 38 notes that the result for 1997 is striking given the absence of an existential threat in 1997 that was comparable to 1994 at the height of the North Korean nuclear crisis.
She suggests that 'those who felt that the security environment has deteriorated' grew in number throughout the 1990s (ibid.), indicating that a shift in Japan's security concerns entailed reconstruction in the language of threat perception. Here again, the geographical realities defining Japan's perceived vulnerabilities collided with the constraints of alliance commitments.
It was within these international and domestic contexts that the official narratives of Surrounding Areas emerged. The April 1996 meeting between President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro sought to review the 1978
Guidelines, 'reaffirming the MSA as the basis upon which both the US and Japan seek to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region into the 21 st Century' (Tanaka, 1997: 344) . Superficially, the communiqué was a re-statement of the MSA:
the Asia-Pacific region remained squarely within Japan's gaze and Japan was to remain under the US nuclear umbrella. Yet, Tokyo was urged to enhance its military role, as well as expanding the regional scope of its defence periphery. The statement clarified the need to maintain peace and stability, but it remained vague: the Soviet Union disintegrated while China was emerging as a major military power, and Taiwan remained a taboo. This was underlined in the 1995 Taiko which concluded that a large-scale military conflict was highly unlikely following the end of the Cold War, but the possibility of small-scale military conflicts in the Surrounding Areas persisted.
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The absence of a clear geographical delineation within the evolving official discourse also suggests that Tokyo is cognisant of the potential for any danger to emerge anywhere. The challenge of reconciling emergent threats in an unfamiliar international setting perceived through the familiar geographical worldview provides a fertile ground upon which the Surrounding Areas narratives remain obscure. As Graham (2006: 5) argues,
The elastic spatial definition of sea lanes also gave supporters of an extraterritorial defence role for the MSDF and Air Self Defence Force (ASDF) the flexibility to expand the geographical boundaries of Japan's self-defence zone without directly confronting the proscriptions against overseas dispatch and collective self-defence, which have constrained where, how and with whom the SDF can operate.
The official documents take for granted this vagueness as if the meanings and implications are self-evident. Graham (2006: 182) Attempts to delimit the scope of the Guidelines geographically are dropped in favour of a vague formula to minimize controversy, whereby the Guidelines would apply 'in situations and areas surrounding Japan', and at the same time preserving ambiguity over whether Japan would assist US efforts to repel Chinese aggression across the [Taiwan] strait (212).
The 1995 Taiko maintains this vagueness. Sado Akihiro suggests that a changing international environment facilitated a transformation in Japan's international role. Crises in the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait, along with 'new threats' emerging in the post-9/11 international environment, compelled Japan to forge closer co-operation with the US (Sado, 2007: 193 
The Far East, the Asia-Pacific, and Surrounding Areas
The narratives of Surrounding Areas are not only ambiguous, but in comparing and contrasting the MSA with the New Guidelines, the Far East as a regional signifier is now interspersed with other regional symbols-the Asia-Pacific and Surrounding
Areas. The 1978 Guidelines considered invasion of Japan as a prominent threat, along with the wider security concerns in the Far East (Tanaka, 1997: 284) . Two years before that, the 1976 Taiko reiterated Tokyo's realisation that 'while there seems to be a balance of power between the Soviet Union and China, there are new threats emanating from the Korean Peninsula, and that we need to be mindful of military developments in the neighbouring states' (Iriye, 1991: 165) . But by the April 1996 summit, the Far East became just one of many signifiers denoting Japan's vulnerability. In Section 3 titled 'The Regional Outlook', their joint declaration states that:
Since the end of the Cold War, the possibility of global armed conflict has receded. The last few years have seen expanded political and security dialogue among countries in the region. Respect for democratic principles is growing. Prosperity is more widespread than at any time in history, and we are witnessing the emergence of an Asia-Pacific community. The Asia-Pacific region has become the most dynamic area of the globe. At the same time, instability and uncertainty persist in the region. Tensions continue on the Korean Peninsula. There are still heavy concentrations of military force, including nuclear arsenals. Unresolved territorial disputes, potential regional conflicts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery all constitute sources of instability (Hook, et al., 2001: 476-77 ).
Here, we can identify several geographical signifiers: the 'Asia-Pacific'; the 'countries in the region'; and the 'Korean Peninsula'. Simultaneously, the recognition that the developments in 'the weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery' imply that the 'sources of instability' are omnipresent, to the extent that a flexible delineation of Japan's defence perimeter is seen as an imperative.
This ambiguity survives within the narratives of New Guidelines and beyond, with Tokyo's sensitivities toward Beijing reflected in the triumvirate of under-defined regional designators. The 1997 edition of the Defence of Japan (JDA, 1997: 101-2) suggests that the 'Asia-Pacific is different from Europe' and 'for the security of our country, events in the surrounding areas need to be stable'. It refers to MSA as a tool for peace and stability in the Far East; but also points out that the alliance is crucial to 'maintaining peace and stability in areas surrounding our country' (145). The 1998 issue (JDA, 1998: 103) follows the basic framework, referring to Surrounding Areas as implying a situational concept that addresses security within the international environment, but specifically refers to the Far East within the context of MSA (104-5).
But in reference to the 1996 communiqué, both the 1997 and 1998 editions revert to the Asia-Pacific as a regional signifier for US-Japan co-operation into the 21 st century (JDA, 1997: 147; 1998, 106-7) . Subsequent issues maintain this format, juggling the Hence, the official narratives of Surrounding Areas denote ambiguities within Japan's own deliberations of its defence periphery: it is the Far East in reference to the MSA, but becomes the Asia-Pacific once the attention turns to enhanced co-operation.
Yet, the addition of 'new dangers', not to mention further pressures from the US, necessitates a switch to the language of Surrounding Areas. Furthermore, this helps to obscure Tokyo's concern over the Taiwan Strait, vis-à-vis Beijing, presenting an additional incentive to frame future foreign policy considerations in a situational, rather than a geographical, language.
What Happens Determines the Location
Policy makers insist that Surrounding Areas are a situational term rather than a geographical one. The cohabitation of the Far East, the Asia-Pacific, and Surrounding
Areas in the JDA/MOD documents suggests that geography matters and situational anxieties are prevalent. Yokota Koichi (1997: 52-53) Here again, the emergence of the situational term to symbolise Japan's threat perception and the concomitant need to show Tokyo's willingness to enhance its international involvement derives from an admixture of external-and domestic factors.
The memories of the Gulf War fiasco made it an imperative to react proactively to international crises following 9/11. The terrorist attacks provided the extra momentum for Tokyo to reassert its international commitment. Shinoda Tomohito (2010: 26) notes that, already on 19 September 2001, the government outlined seven steps in response to the attacks, including its readiness to deploy naval vessels for within which the UNSC determines that there are threats to peace and security that might influence Japan's safety (Tamaki, 2007: 217) . According to Tamaki Kazuhiko (2007: 217-16) , sanctions against North Korea, including visitation rights on vessels, might fall within the purview of Surrounding Areas, thereby forcing Tokyo to identify Pyongyang's provocation as an emergency-with obvious consequences. Thus, situational notion might be useful in addressing potential, domestic, opposition; but its ambiguity also carries inherent foreign policy risks for Japan.
Taiwan or Not to Taiwan
The cohabitation of the under-defined Far East, the Asia-Pacific, and Surrounding
Areas within the official narratives represents the resilience of perceived threats from the Korean Peninsula and especially the Taiwan Strait. The former JDA Vice Minister, Akiyama Masahiro, recalls that the 'primary concern was the Korean Peninsula; and that Japan's role in forging global peace and stability was an abstract concept' at the time when the 1996 US-Japan Communiqué and the New Guidelines were negotiated. 17 Asahi shimbun notes that the Japanese government remains reluctant to admit whether the Taiwan It is not surprising that Taiwan remains within Japan's gaze, along with the Korean Peninsula, as it involves balance of power between China and the US, and hence, Japan's alliance commitments. Yahuda (2011: 325) argues that Japan expressed concern during the 1995-96 Sino-American standoff given that the Chinese 'missiles [were] being directed to the north of Taiwan near the territorial waters of one of its most southern islets'. Despite the rhetorical conundrum in determining whether or not the Taiwan Strait falls within the purview of Surrounding Areas, Tokyo's concern with Chinese military spending became more paramount. Coupled with the Korean Peninsula, Japan felt that 'the Chinese side appeared to be pressing for the long-term withdrawal of American forces from Japan without the Chinese acknowledging that the Japanese had any legitimate security needs of their own' (326).
For Tokyo, the dangers were evident in the Taiwan Strait; but the question was whether this warranted labelling as Surrounding Areas. The official ambiguity of Surrounding Areas represents Tokyo that is in between change and continuity. On the one hand, the change is easier to detect. The regional designation-whether be it the Far East or the Asia-Pacific-was augmented by an even more ambiguous, but equally ambitious, situational term. The new delineation provides Japan with a justification to send troops to areas beyond the purview of its previous defence periphery, citing unknowable, yet omnipresent, danger that satisfies Japan's urge to become a responsible member of the international community. On the other hand, the continuity exposes itself in the form of resilient threat perception emanating from the Korean Peninsula and China, as well as a sense of vulnerability deriving from the need to secure SLOCs. 20 China's nervousness over Taiwan remains a reality for Japanese foreign policy; but it provides an opportunity for the Surrounding Areas narrative to enhance its potency as a foreign policy signifier. Hence, it denotes a recalibration, rather than a re-definition, of Japan's Asia imaginary.
Prospects for Further Recalibration?
The landslide victory by the DPJ in the August 2009 general election provides an interesting moment of reflection. It is still premature to assess whether the new government will instigate fundamental changes to the dominant narratives of Japanese threat perception; or whether the process of recalibration will continue. Leif-Eric Easley et al. (2010) Easley et al. (2010: 6) note that,
The vast majority of DPJ members consider the US-Japan alliance an essential stabilizer in the Asia-Pacific region but are reluctant to work with the United States in ways that involve dispatching the Japanese Self-Denfense Forces (JSDF) overseas…..The DPJ's 'Basic Policy' puts the alliance with the Untied States at the center of Japan's security policy, and other major policy statements also endorse the alliance.
Even on the eve of the Upper House election in July 2010, the DPJ Manifesto repeats its pledge to forge a closer, yet equal, partnership with the US. As for Okinawa, the U-turn by the Hatoyama cabinet is reflected in the ambiguous phrase in referring to the Futenma airbase, stating that 'we will work towards alleviating the burden borne by Okinawa in accordance with the bilateral agreement' (DPJ, 2010: 11). As it is expected from a largely centre-left party, the DPJ intends to uphold the principles of pacifism (12).
Superficially, the difference between the new DPJ government and its LDP predecessor lies in the determination of the circumstances under which the SDF can be deployed for national security, as well as maintaining Japan's international prestige.
Indeed, the June 2011 US-Japan Joint Statement of the Security Consultative
Committee reiterates the familiar set of themes, ranging from North Korea (p. 3);
calling for China to play a 'responsible and constructive role in regional stability and prosperity' (p. 4); as well as maintaining 'safety and security of the maritime domain' (p. 5). 28 Given that the DPJ does not reject MSA, but instead, proposes to enhance Japan's role in it, the issue of how far the SDF can and should be utilised will remain contested. However, given the DPJ's stress on the MSA as the basis for Japanese foreign and security policies, along with its reiteration of 'peace and stability', references to pacifism remain intact, suggesting that future debates will centre on how, not whether, Japan should maintain its international role. 
Conclusion
Ambiguities inherent within the official narratives of Surrounding Areas fulfil the dual purpose for Japanese policy makers seeking to improve Tokyo's international reputation by rationalising its involvement in the so-called 'War on Terror', while simultaneously re-discovering the newly emergent sources of danger that are present but not fully realisable. In one respect, this process might be understood as Japan acquiescing to the US pressure in augmenting its own military involvement in the 'War on Terror' and the security of the Asia-Pacific in general. To that extent, the elaboration of Surrounding Areas into a situational term simply expands the scope of Far East as Japan's defence perimeter in order to satisfy the alliance partner. Indeed, the new DPJ government objects to this, which explains its assertion that the Party seeks 'equal partnership' with the US instead. Yet, a detailed reading of the Surrounding Areas narratives suggests that there is a cohabitation of Japan's resilient image of Asia as a potentially dangerous neighbourhood, on the one hand; with Tokyo's perceived imperative to live up to its self-proclaimed role as a pacifist state willing to take initiatives in promoting interdependence, on the other (Tamaki, 2010: ch. 3). Perhaps the previous DPJ government's dithering over Futenma Air Base is one illustration of the new recalibration process.
The cohabitation of resilient danger and the ever-changing international environment attests to the reification of Asia within Japan's identity construction.
Whether be it Yamagata's delineation of the cordon of sovereignty or interest; or the anxiety over the security of SLOC both before and after the War, they all converge on one point: that Asia has always been a source of danger for Japanese existence.
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Moreover, Tokyo's gaze upon the post-Cold War-and post-9/11-international environment suggests that danger is now 'everywhere' to the extent that Asia as a notional signifier and as a source of danger is consolidated into a new narrative of anxiety. This shows that the reconstruction of Japanese Self goes hand in hand with the re-assessment of threat; and that the urge to re-define and redress danger is very much an integral part of identity reconstruction. Needless to say, the change is incremental rather than drastic; but the subtlety is characteristic of how the recalibration of threat perception based on a familiar frame of reference takes place. It is a process based on addressing the contemporary worldview informed through a historically constructed regional imaginary.
The significance of Surrounding Areas as an ambiguity indicates that Asia is still very much a dynamic region that necessitates flexibility and entails contingency;
and even the DPJ's designation of the Far East and areas around the Far East attest to this. Tokyo's emerging sense of threat beyond the familiar confines of the AsiaPacific region provides ample source of anxieties for Japan. Obscuring the regional term into a situational signifier needs to be understood as a recalibration of Japan's Asian existence whereby Japan seeks to resolve this slippage. As such, Tokyo's penchant for the pacifist narrative remains robust in spite of the alarm within the neighbouring capitals. The seeming contradiction between this and Japan's enhanced role in the so-called 'War on Terror' is representative of this regional dynamism. This implies that the challenges ahead for Japanese policy makers to tread a fine line between maintaining its international profile, on the one hand; and placating sceptical Asian governments, on the other, are formidable. Tokyo is, and will be, recalibrating its threat perception no matter who is in charge of the country.
